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STEVE TSANG
The U.S. Military and American Commitment to 
Taiwan’s Security
AbSTrACT
This article focuses on how the U.S. military assesses the threat of a Taiwan Strait crisis 
over the next two decades, America’s possible responses, and the U.S. capacity for 
effective intervention. It examines the drivers behind the U.S. approach, highlighting 
their implications. 
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The government of the United States of America is committed un-
der the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 to “maintain the capacity of 
the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of 
the people on Taiwan.”1 As a symbol of American commitment to the 
security of Taiwan, the Act is no less credible than the mutual defense 
treaties the U.S. has with its other major Asian allies, or the defense 
treaty with Taiwan, that it in effect replaced. The only threat to Taiwan’s 
security and existence as a state comes from the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).
The passing of the Act was intended to reassure Taiwan (officially 
known as the Republic of China [ROC]) of American support when the 
U.S. ended formal diplomatic relations with it and opened them instead 
with China in 1971; the ROC until then had occupied China’s seat at the 
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1.  TRA, January 1, 1979, <http://www.ait.org.tw/en/about_Ait/tra/>, accessed February 15, 2010.
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U.N.2 The Act was meant to deter the PRC from seeking a non-peaceful 
means to change the status of Taiwan. It does not legally commit the U.S. 
to come to Taiwan’s defense automatically. Nor does it require the U.S. 
administration of the day to go beyond upholding American national 
interests in case a crisis over Taiwan were to escalate into a full scale, po-
tentially nuclear, war with the PRC. It merely requires the administration 
of the day to start a “process by which the United States may recognize 
and act upon its own security interests.”3 This is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from the stipulation in the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC 
(1955) that required the U.S. government to “act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”4 What the TRA 
does stipulate is that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by 
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] a 
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
concern to the United States.”5 
To meet the requirement that the U.S. must maintain the capacity to 
resist changes being forced upon Taiwan, the U.S. Pacific Command (PA-
COM) has a contingency plan to help Taiwan defend itself. This started as a 
concept plan (CONPLAN 5077) under the Reagan administration and was 
upgraded to an operation plan (OPLAN-5077-4) during the first term of 
the George W. Bush administration. The upgrading means that units likely 
to be required are being nominally assigned.6 The need to meet such a con-
tingency is consequently taken more into account by U.S. planners as forces 
are regularly modernized, restructured, or redeployed. Because there are only 
a handful of OPLANs in existence, the upgrade reflects how seriously the 
U.S. takes the matter—even after the “global war on terrorism” became the 
focus of U.S. planners following the September 11 attacks. However, making 
a contingency plan and upgrading it does not imply that the U.S. is actively 
2. Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942 (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2004), pp. 150–55.
3. Richard M. Pious, “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Constitutional and Legal Context,” in 
Louis W. Koenig, James C. Hsiung, and King-yuh Chang (eds.), Congress, the Presidency, and the 
Taiwan Relations Act (N.Y.: Praeger, 1985), p. 161.
4. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROC (1955), <http://www.taiwandocu-
ments.org/mutual01.htm>, accessed February 24, 2012. 
5. “Taiwan Relations Act,” January 1, 1979, <http://www.ait.org.tw/en/about_Ait/tra/>, accessed 
February 15, 2010.
6. William M. Arkin, “America’s New China War Plan,” June 10, 2006, <http://militarynuts.
com/ar/t911.htm>, accessed February 27, 2012.
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preparing, even less wishing, for a war with China. On the contrary, it is part 
of the deterrence.
In the event of a crisis over Taiwan, how the administration of the day will 
honor U.S. commitments to Taiwan will depend on a wide range of vari-
ables, in addition to the legal commitment, which is a non-variable factor.7 
The most important of these variables are the views of the president and his 
close advisers, Congressional opinions, and the relationship between the U.S. 
executive and the legislative branches at the time. They are in turn affected by 
the mood of the nation; political, economic, and budgetary priorities within 
the U.S.; the state of its worldwide commitments; the state of U.S.-China 
relations; the state of U.S.-Taiwan relations; how the crisis emerged; Taiwan’s 
own capacity and determination to defend itself; and the general situation 
in East Asia, as well as the willingness of American allies to help. Since the 
time frame and the conditions under which such a crisis may arise cannot be 
predicted, this paper will not address these issues. 
Instead, this paper focuses on how the U.S. military assesses the likely 
threat and requirements for it to respond over the next two decades, and 
its capacity to do so effectively. In an important sense, the U.S. responses 
will vary according to specific scenarios. It is impossible to examine all the 
scenarios by which the PRC could use force against Taiwan: the range is 
limited only by the imagination of the planners. An apparently obvious one 
is a full scale amphibious assault similar to the Normandy landings of 1944. 
This can be dismissed as the most unlikely choice, since despite its impres-
sive building program for amphibious ships, “the total number of troops and 
equipment that China would be able to transport for force projection remains 
constrained.”8 To mount a Normandy-style attack would also require a com-
mand of the sea and air that Chinese forces cannot achieve within the next 
two decades if U.S. forces should actively support Taiwan. This assessment 
also reflects a basic working premise of this paper—unless it feels “provoked” 
by Taiwan, the PRC will not take the initiative to use force if it believes it 
cannot win or effectively deter the U.S. from helping Taiwan to defend itself. 
This, in turn, is based on the political reality that the legitimacy of the PRC 
7. How the terms of the TRA should be implemented is a variable factor that will be affected 
by the other factors. The legal commitment is not a variable, until the Act is repealed or amended.
8. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power,” Washington Quarterly 31:3 (2008), p. 134. 
For a study of the most likely war scenarios, see Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, “The Alternative to Peace: 
War Scenarios,” in Steve Tsang, ed., Peace and Security across the Taiwan Strait (Basingstoke, U.K.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 168–88.
780   •  ASiAN SUrVEy 52:4
leadership could be greatly jeopardized if it adopted an adventurist policy over 
such a highly nationalistically charged issue and ended up in a humiliating 
retreat. Hence, this article will focus on the most likely scenario, which could 
also transform itself into the worst case one. 
The scenario most preferred by the PRC leadership is one of successfully 
persuading Taiwan to start negotiations for unification by an implied threat 
to use force. Should this materialize as planned, it would be Beijing’s (but 
not the U.S.’s or Taiwan’s) best case scenario. However, this approach could 
easily transform itself into a completely different one—the most likely sce-
nario—as a result of miscalculation followed by unwitting escalation. In 
specific terms, the most likely scenario involves the PRC authorities mis-
calculating that they can effectively deter the U.S. from interfering as they 
demonstrate overwhelming military superiority to intimidate Taipei, requir-
ing it to open formal negotiations for unification. As will be examined below, 
should democratic Taiwan offer resistance stronger than Beijing expects while 
the U.S. refuses to be deterred, escalation would become unavoidable. The 
PRC leadership fears it would lose legitimacy, should it then back down from 
fulfilling its “sacred mission” to unify Taiwan. The direction of escalation 
for any crisis is not pre-determined. But the widespread belief among many 
Chinese officers is that “killing a carrier”—either by sinking or damaging 
the ship so badly that it can no longer operate—is the most effective way to 
persuade the U.S. to back off; this means it may well be adopted as policy. 
Should this trigger the U.S. to respond with greater determination and force 
(examined below), we will see an escalation spiral, which could easily turn 
into the worst case scenario.
Neither the U.S. nor the PRC wishes the worst case scenario to materialize, 
because it would involve a military confrontation. In the event of a crisis, 
both sides will try to contain and avoid escalation to a full scale war between 
two major nuclear powers. But avoiding escalation after casualties have oc-
curred and national prestige has been put at risk will require extraordinary 
authority, good sense, confidence, and effective diplomacy to reach a political 
settlement that leaves leaders of both countries with the capacity to face down 
their domestic political enemies.
The risk that the PRC may take actions over Taiwan that subject Beijing 
and Washington to a possible spiral of escalation is not negligible. This is 
because there is considerable scope for Chinese analysts and policy makers 
to think that the U.S. can be deterred from fulfilling the terms of the TRA, 
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particularly given the relative rise in Chinese capabilities and the expected 
reshaping and redefining of U.S. ones over the next two decades.9 
Hence, this article examines and explains the dynamics that drive the U.S. 
military responses to the most probable scenario. The raison d’être for the 
paper is to reduce the scope for policy makers and analysts, particularly in 
China, to miscalculate how the U.S. would respond to a Taiwan Strait crisis.10 
If miscalculation can be eliminated, this should deter the PRC from taking 
initiatives that could spawn an escalation spiral. 
In the event of a crisis, it is up to the U.S. government and Congress 
to make a policy response proportionate to national interest, but it is the 
responsibility of the Department of Defense (DOD) to give the national 
command authority the needed recommendations and capacity to fulfil the 
terms of the TRA. Understanding the U.S. military’s basic thinking on the 
problem, and its ability to respond to a Taiwan-related security threat, should 
help policy makers avoid a miscalculation that might escalate from a calcu-
lated and limited use of force into a major confrontation no one desires. A 
separate but related working premise for this paper is that whatever very long 
term ambition the Chinese government may have, its objectives over Taiwan 
remain as they have publicly maintained since 1950, rather than an excuse to 
launch a full scale war with the U.S. 
The main thrust of this paper is to examine how the U.S. military will 
meet the kind of threat in the most likely scenario of the PRC government 
using force to make Taiwan accept unification with the Mainland. The paper 
outlines briefly the perceived threats and focuses on how the U.S. military 
establishment will assess and respond to them. In so doing, it addresses the 
question of how effectively Beijing can deter the U.S. from fulfilling the 
terms of the TRA. The paper ends with an evaluation of the implications of 
the findings and suggests that counterintuitive though it may be, it is in the 
PRC’s interest that Taiwan should be allowed to maintain a credible defense 
capability in the foreseeable future. 
9. Guangqian Peng, “Peace or War: Taiwan at a Critical Juncture,” China Security 4:1 (2008), 
pp. 67–68; and Chito Romana, “Does China Want to Be Top Superpower?” ABC News, March 2, 
2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/china-replace-us-top-superpower/story?id=9986355>, 
accessed March 3, 2010.
10. Chinese officers who are allowed to articulate their views often reveal a poor understanding 
or a somewhat dismissive assessment of the U.S. commitment to respond to a Taiwan crisis. David 
Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), pp. 309–11. 
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THrEAT ANAlySiS  ANd MiSSioN rEqUirEMENTS
The Chinese government prefers to persuade or passively coerce Taiwan to 
join China without fighting a war, but it has never given up the right to use 
force to achieve this objective, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
sees as a matter of national sovereignty and territorial integrity—a core inter-
est.11 In light of Taiwan’s strategic location from the Chinese perspective, the 
Chinese government also deems control over Taiwan to be a “vital national 
interest without which the security and welfare of the Chinese state will be 
in jeopardy.”12 
After independence-minded Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian of 
the Democratic Progressive Party left office in 2008, the Chinese gov-
ernment adjusted its policy, easing tension.13 Its current policy is to get 
Taiwan as fully integrated as possible economically, socially, and cul-
turally with mainland China so that Taiwan will find it too costly to 
resist a future call for unification, backed by an implied use of force. The 
calculation is that when China demands unification it can demonstrate 
such overwhelming comprehensive national strength that the govern-
ment of Taiwan will have no choice but to agree to negotiate the terms 
for unification. To make such a prospect acceptable to Taiwan, Beijing 
is prepared to exercise maximum flexibility, including negotiating the 
political framework for unification.
The problem is that however spectacularly China has progressed in the past 
three decades, including impressive improvement in governance, its “con-
sultative Leninist” political system does not practice democracy or respect 
human rights.14 The CCP leadership does not understand how proud and 
attached the people of Taiwan are to their democracy and way of life. If they 
were forced to choose, they could not be expected to accept unification un-
der a Leninist regime, albeit a consultative one that is delivering impressive 
economic growth. The maximum degree of flexibility that Beijing is willing 
to exercise is limited ultimately by a rigid framework: unification under the 
11. Dai Bingguo, “Zhongguo de hexin liyi shi shenme?” [What are China’s core interests?], China 
Election and Governance website of the Carter Center, July 29, 2009, <http://www.chinaelections.
org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=154270>, accessed February 17, 2010.
12. Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 161.
13. Xin Qiang, “Mainland China’s Taiwan Policy Adjustments,” China Security 5:1 (2009), pp. 53–64.
14. Steve Tsang, “Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework,” Journal of Contem-
porary China 18:62 (2009), pp. 865–80.
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continued monopoly of power by the CCP.15 This framework provides no 
scope for democracy to continue in Taiwan. With Taiwan’s defense forces now 
fully nationalized and answerable to a democratically elected government, 
they can be expected to fight to defend their own freedom, democratic way 
of life, individual dignity, and families. Hence, the Chinese calculation is 
unlikely to work through peaceful assimilation. As such, a Chinese attempt 
to use implied force to require Taiwan to negotiate for unification will almost 
certainly be rebuffed. 
While there is no consensus in Taiwan over what is the best option for its 
future, a clear majority rejects unification, and this trend is strengthening.16 
This implies that no state presidents in Taiwan, regardless of party affiliation 
or personal disposition, can gain reelection if they should seek unification 
with China. With the CCP’s own legitimacy dependent on its capacity to 
deliver on this nationalistic aspiration, events could easily escalate because 
increasingly powerful nationalist elements will probably force the hands of 
the leadership as a whole.17 The impact of nationalism on the interpretation 
of China’s policy to rise peacefully, which is a key driver behind its Taiwan 
policy, can be seen in Beijing’s informal elevation of the South China Sea 
to become a “core national interest” in the spring of 2010.18 In so doing, the 
Chinese leadership did not jettison the policy to rise peacefully but merely 
took a more nationalistic interpretation.
 This nationalistic articulation of the “peaceful rise strategy” is highly coun-
terproductive because it causes alarm among neighbors and raises questions 
about China’s assertion that its rise threatens no one.19 But it was introduced 
nevertheless. In other words, a Chinese initiative to coerce the government in 
15. The concept of maximum flexibility within a rigid framework was first used by Steve Tsang to 
explain how the PRC government handled the reunification of Hong Kong with mother China. See 
“Maximum Flexibility, Rigid Framework: China’s Policy towards Hong Kong and Its Implications,” 
Journal of International Affairs 49:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 413–33. 
16. Chia-lung Lin, “The Importance of China and Identity Politics in Taiwan’s Diplomacy,” in 
Steve Tsang, ed., Taiwan and the International Community (Oxford, U.K.: Peter Lang, 2008), pp. 
58–59.
17. Cong Riyun, “Nationalism and Democratization in Contemporary China,” Journal of Con-
temporary China 18:62 (2009), p. 847.
18. John Pomfret, “Beijing Claims ‘Indisputable Sovereignty’ over South China Sea,” Wash-
ington Post, July 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/
AR2010073005664.htm>, accessed August 2, 2010. 
19. Donald K. Emmerson, “China’s ‘Frown Diplomacy’ in Southeast Asia,” PacNet 45, October 
6, 2010 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies]), <http://
csis.org/files/publication/pac1045.pdf>, accessed November 22, 2010.
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Taiwan to open negotiations for unification can easily escalate into a political 
necessity to use force if the government in Taipei acts on the domestic politi-
cal imperative and rejects the call for unification. Whether Beijing will take 
the initiative to require Taipei to accept unification depends ultimately on 
China’s assessment of its capacity to deter the U.S. from fulfilling the terms 
of the TRA.20 Beijing will act if it believes it can do so.
How to respond as a state to such an eventuality is a matter for politicians 
in Washington, not one for the military. The assessment of overall U.S. na-
tional interest requires a political judgement that is beyond the remit of the 
defense establishment. For the DOD, its responsibilities in this regard are 
to support U.S. interests, policy, and strategy, as well as maintain a global 
presence to influence, deter, and provide for regional stability. To do so, the 
department recognizes an implicit duty under the TRA to be prepared for 
a contingency across the Taiwan Strait. The critical issues are what kinds of 
threat Taiwan would face and how U.S. forces could meet them effectively. 
The most likely scenario of China actually using force will involve a clever 
combination of two basic requirements.21 On the one hand, it will mean 
precision strikes that aim to destroy Taiwan’s command and control system, 
decapitate its political and military leadership, and destroy key military in-
stallations.22 This will require the application of information warfare, the use 
of short-range ballistic and cruise missiles, other precision guided weapons, 
and Special Forces to destroy key military installations, terrify the civilian 
population, and force the government in Taipei into submission before the 
U.S. political establishment can agree on how to respond. This is likely to be 
backed up by the mobilization and forward deployment of the field armies 
and amphibious units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On the other 
hand, the PLA will need to deter U.S. forces from coming to the active de-
fense of Taiwan. This will involve the PLA attempting to seize control in the 
air, sea, and space domains and thus require Taiwan to accept or negotiate 
20. Chinese opinion shapers with close links to policy makers habitually see the U.S. commit-
ment to Taiwan’s security as the key obstacle to unification, implying that if the former is removed, 
the latter can be achieved. See Guangjian Peng, “Peace or War: Taiwan at a Critical Juncture,” China 
Security 4:1 (Winter 2008), pp. 61–69; and Xuetong Yan, “The Rise of China and Its Power Status,” 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 1:1 (Summer 2006), pp. 27–29. 
21. Steve Tsang, “Drivers Behind the Use of Force,” in idem, ed., If China Attacks Taiwan: Military 
Strategy, Politics, and Economics (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 6–8.
22. Liu Qingyuan, Jiexi Zhonggong Guojia Anquan Zhanlue [Explaining the national security 
strategy of the Chinese communists] (Taipei: Yangzhi wenhua, 2003), pp. 132–37.
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for unification. If Taiwan’s government follows suit, this would seriously 
undermine the legitimacy and international support for the U.S. to interfere.
If such a scenario should develop, any able commander of PACOM will 
quietly take certain basic precautionary measures in response, without preju-
dicing the outcome of the political process in Washington. OPLAN 5077-4 
(or its revised edition) will be activated and updated to meet the requirements 
of the day and will be given precedence over other routine deployments. 
Forces will be put in place to answer a call to duty by the political masters 
within a week or so. Commanders will put forces on alert, deploy the capital 
ships to sea to reduce their vulnerability, and order U.S. bases in East Asia 
and the Pacific to get ready to receive, service, and support additional combat 
units that may be redeployed from mainland U.S. bases. At the wider national 
level, forces will be put on a higher state of readiness so that carrier air-wings, 
plus air force and other units outside of PACOM, can be ordered quickly 
to the Pacific. There, they will join carriers, other platforms, and bases for 
forward deployment, should the president and Congress decide to support 
Taiwan in its defense. 
The basic assumption of the U.S. military is the following: should it find 
itself facing the prospect of a confrontation with a great power that is increas-
ingly becoming a “near peer competitor,” it will make all combat ready units 
available as quickly as possible. It will not respond only with forces normally 
available within PACOM. Given that by December 2012 all 10 active service 
U.S. carriers share the same basic platform, design, training, and readiness 
construct, the transfer and redeployment of carrier air-wings from wherever 
they may be to the Pacific Ocean in an emergency is a relatively straight-
forward matter.23 At present, even the carrier deployed in support of U.S. 
operations in Afghanistan can be redeployed. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
maintains sufficient capability and is globally postured to quickly backfill 
naval air assets if required. Additionally, and if necessary, a less combat ready 
carrier air-wing from the U.S. can be reconstituted and mobilized for deploy-
ment even if its assigned carrier cannot be because of the large maintenance 
requirements of refitting. Despite the pressure on resources and extensive 
deployments since the early 2000s, at a push the U.S. Navy can surge six 
23. Until the end of 2012, there are 11 carriers. There will only be 10 after the USS Enterprise, the 
only non-Nimitz class ship still in service, is decommissioned in December. The coming into service 
in the next decade of the Gerald Ford class of super carriers should not complicate matters too much, 
as they can accommodate everything a Nimitz class carrier-based air-wing requires. 
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carrier strike groups in short order to a contingency, with an additional two 
strike groups as backup.24 Surface combatant ships not required for carrier 
protection will be put on a state of readiness for deployment to major sea 
routes, so that the option will be available to the U.S. government to secure 
sea lines of communication. The “tyranny of distance” for the deployment 
of U.S. forces outside of PACOM cannot be eliminated, but its impact can 
and almost certainly will be reduced by the early informal mobilization of 
forces while politicians deliberate in Washington. 
In assessing the actual requirements, the U.S. military will need to judge 
the level and nature of threats from the PLA and the capacity of Taiwan’s 
defense forces to hold off the PLA while the political process runs its course 
in Washington. Until the U.S. government has decided on its policy, the mili-
tary will merely observe, assess, prepare, and pre-position to harmonize na-
tional strategy with routine forward presence to influence and reassure allies. 
Assessing the scale and nature of assistance that Taiwan needs is a sig-
nificant factor that policy makers in Washington will take into account as 
they deliberate a policy. The less Taiwan needs direct U.S. assistance, which 
implies a higher degree of readiness on the island to respond to a military 
contingency, the easier it is for such support to be given. If, for example, 
Taiwan requires the U.S. to supply missiles and other munitions or even 
weapon systems to replace battle losses, these can be provided relatively eas-
ily and quickly within the constraints of inventory. In the event of a need to 
replace battle losses among Taiwan’s F-16s, this can be done by diverting such 
aircraft from the USAF or Air National Guard.25 The scope for this process is 
receding by the year, however. The USAF stopped purchasing F-16s in 2007, 
and the bulk of them are reaching their 6,000-hour life expectancy, although 
several programs are in place to extend life to 8,000–10,000 hours. Thus, the 
ability for the U.S. to replace Taiwan losses quickly will decline, and a decade 
from now there will be gaps in how quickly reinforcement and replacement 
may be accomplished.26 One possible step up the ladder of military interven-
tion would be helping Taiwan to break a PLA blockade or taking over the 
24. Henry L. Dickson, “Surging Ahead, Navy Implements New Fleet Response Plan,” All 
Hands Magazine, November 2003, via <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBQ/is_1039/
ai_111463944/>. 
25. Something similar happened before: The USAF dispatched active-service jets to the Israeli 
Air Force to replace battle losses during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.
26. For detailed analysis, see “F-16 Fighting Falcon Service Life,” undated, at <www.globalsecu-
rity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-life.htm>, accessed August 2, 2010.
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maritime and air security east of Taiwan in order to free up Taiwanese forces 
to defend their western coast and the Strait. Unless U.S. forces tasked with 
such missions were specifically targeted by the PLA—which would seriously 
risk escalation—such missions could be accomplished by U.S. forces operat-
ing out of nearby bases and naval platforms and would likely be approved by 
Washington relatively readily.
The implications of the shift in the balance of military power across the 
Taiwan Strait in China’s favor, which is already happening, are not as straight-
forward as it may appear to Chinese military planners. Indeed, a significant 
further strengthening of the PLA’s advantages needs to materialize before the 
CCP leadership can take the initiative, without “provocation” from Taiwan, 
to require the island to accept unification. While such a demonstration of 
the PLA’s overwhelming advantages may intimidate many people in Taiwan 
and persuade some U.S. opinion leaders to advocate caution, it would also 
likely trigger the U.S. military to prepare to interfere more quickly and more 
extensively.
The last time U.S. forces actively supported Taiwan’s defense was during 
the crisis of 1958. On this occasion, the crisis was so severe that President 
Dwight Eisenhower considered using nuclear weapons if absolutely neces-
sary.27 While the U.S. “massively reinforced” Taiwan, no U.S. combat sup-
port was actually required because the Taiwanese, particularly the air force, 
performed spectacularly.28 With Taiwan’s defense capacity currently in relative 
decline,29 Taipei is unlikely to repeat the sterling performance of 1958 in a 
future crisis. This means that if Chinese deterrence against the U.S. should 
fail, the need for U.S. forces to intervene could arise quickly. Intervention 
might include attacking PLA missile batteries and command and control cen-
ters, as well as logistics, communication, and staging bases opposite Taiwan, 
although the risk of escalation means that such attacks will not be launched 
without presidential authorization. Taiwan is aware of this and is trying to 
27. Morton H. Halperin, The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: A Documented History (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND, 1966), p. 99. The 1996 U.S. deployment of two carrier battle groups was primarily 
for moral support and to send a clear message to Beijing. They were not required or expected to give 
active support to Taiwan’s defense forces.
28. Steve Tsang, The Cold War’s Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership between the Republic of 
China and the United Kingdom, 1950–1958 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 146–47.
29. Peter Enav, “Pentagon Paints Grim Picture of Taiwan Air Defense,” Washington Post, February 
22, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022201350.
html>, accessed February 23, 2010.
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minimize such a need by developing and deploying surface to surface mis-
siles for such a contingency. But this does not change the reality that the 
higher the level of direct U.S. military involvement, the greater the risk of 
unintended escalation. 
In general terms, the more seriously a threat is perceived by the U.S. 
military, the more resources are devoted to meet it. U.S. military doctrine 
since World War Two has instilled in its officers a sense that the services will, 
when the situation demands, meet whatever challenges they face with the 
resources they have at hand. But U.S. commanders also expect to support and 
protect their forwardly deployed forces generously; the idea that generals win 
battles but logistics win wars has long been part of this doctrine. The U.S. 
military’s steadily growing appreciation of the PLA’s impressive improvements 
in capabilities in the past two decades means that the U.S. military will take 
the prospect of having the PLA as an adversary most seriously. It will deploy 
everything at its disposal that is not irretrievably tied down in ongoing opera-
tions to face such an eventuality. This implies that even weapon systems based 
in the continental U.S., such as the missile defense system in Alaska, will be 
activated to support and protect forwardly deployed units. 
Given current U.S. military budgetary allocation and the reconfiguration 
of its forces, helping Taiwan defend itself will place a huge and increasing 
strain on American global capabilities. Before he left office, former Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates had signaled significant and lasting budget cuts de-
signed to trim 30% each from systems, weapons, and platform procurement. 
The cuts were upheld by his successor, Leon Panetta. They include modifica-
tion of aircraft carrier procurement lines, which will result in fewer carriers 
being available as well as near-term elimination of a carrier air-wing. This 
will have a significant impact on deployment, redeployment, and backfilling 
of forces from one contingency to another. In other words, the process will 
reduce U.S. capacity to “surge” naval and air power in the event of a crisis 
over Taiwan. Indeed, the U.S. Navy, a key player in any operation to support 
Taiwan, has already made most of the efficiency gains that can be achieved 
without reducing operational capacity. It has managed a stable deployment 
of fleet and ships despite a 20% decrease in total battle force size over the 
past decade.30 But this process cannot be sustained indefinitely. The number 
30. Daniel Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Swartz, The Navy at a Tipping 
Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis and Solutions 
Study, 2010), p. 5.
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of ships training and conducting exercises in mainland U.S. decreased from 
around 70 in 1998 to 20 in 2010. This means the Navy’s capability will decline 
over time. It also means that on the current trajectory, the Navy’s flexibility 
to meet its global responsibilities, including Taiwan, will be affected adversely 
as the decade progresses. 
CAN CHiNA dETEr THE U.S .  MiliTAry?
How important are the expected decline in U.S. capabilities and the im-
provements in China’s, including the muscle to deny U.S. forces access to 
the Taiwan region? Will they tip the balance and deter the U.S. from helping 
Taiwan in a crisis? The PLA has made remarkable progress in developing area 
denial capabilities in the past 10 years. These include the deployment of mod-
ern ship-based, anti-ship cruise missiles such as the Sunburn (SS-N-22) and 
Sizzler (SS-N-27) systems imported from Russia. Indeed, this progress also 
derives from improvements in officer training, decision making, and delega-
tion of decision making to combat units. Nonetheless, it is the deployment 
of powerful new weapon systems that most catches the public imagination.
The first and foremost of the long-standing key assets for area denial in 
the inventory of the PLA Navy remains its modernizing fleet of 59 attack 
submarines, to which new boats are still being added. The submarines have 
increasingly posed a grave potential threat to the safety of U.S. carrier strike 
groups. Since 1995 the Chinese submarine fleet has been upgraded by 28 
modern vessels, including 12 Russian-made Kilo-class boats.31 The quality and 
capabilities of the more recent indigenous submarines, such as the Song- and 
Yuan-class boats, have also improved dramatically.32 Indeed, a Song subma-
rine surfaced within five miles of the USS Kitty Hawk, inside its screen of 
escorts, in October 2006.33 This put the carrier within range of anti-ship 
missiles and torpedoes. However, whether Chinese submarines can breach 
the three-dimensional anti-submarine surveillance of a fully alert carrier strike 
31. See Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabili-
ties—Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report for Congress, 
RL33153, October 18, 2007.
32. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics (Suitland, Md.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009), p. 21.
33. Mackenzie Eaglen and Jon Rodeback, “Submarine Arms Race in the Pacific: The Chinese 
Challenge to U.S. Undersea Supremacy,” February 2, 2010, Heritage Foundation, <http://www.
heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2367.cfm>, accessed February 25, 2010.
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group in combat conditions remains uncertain.34 In any event, the increasing 
threat from the improving Chinese submarines is one that the U.S. Navy has 
regularly taken into account in its planning. Thus, at this point the growing 
potential threat still cannot deliver the deterrence that the PLA High Com-
mand may wish to achieve.
The most significant capability enhancement in area denial that the Chi-
nese have been developing is a new anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) system 
based on the DF-21D or CSS-5 land-based mobile missile, with a range of 
over 1,500 km.35 It is equipped with maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) 
capable of hitting moving ships at sea and has reportedly reached the testing 
stage.36 No other state has developed such a capability. If it proves effective, 
it will be extremely difficult to defend carriers within its range. The deploy-
ment of such a weapon system may require the U.S. to devote significant 
resources to counter it. However, the efficacy of an operational ASBM system 
in deterrence remains doubtful. The vulnerability of carrier battle groups may 
lead Washington to “pre-emptively destroy or disable missiles or supporting 
assets” such as the satellites that guide the missiles, instead.37 
It is unlikely that the PLA will succeed in deterring the U.S. through this new 
weapon system. For example, firing a missile that deliberately misses hitting a 
carrier battle group will probably escalate, not deter. More likely, U.S. forces 
will attack and eliminate such a threat, whether it scores or not. Even though 
an operational Chinese ASBM capability will be taken very seriously, the U.S. 
Navy has never shied from putting its capital ships in harm’s way if necessary. 
Furthermore, alternative platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles can be 
deployed to perform some of the functions now commonly carried out by car-
rier-based strike aircraft, should the deployment of carriers become restricted.
In any event, how effective the Chinese ASBM system will be in knocking 
a carrier out of action remains to be seen. Should the U.S. Navy find itself 
fighting a war with the PLA, the prospect that America could lose a carrier 
or more has been taken into account, similarly with the possibility of a major 
battle with the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. Any idea that China, by 
34. Michael Kuzik, “To Kill a Carrier,” Stratfor, <www.stratfor.com>, July 2, 2008, p. 3. 
35. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea: Chinese Ana-
lysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review 62:4 (Autumn 2009), p. 34. 
36. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2010), pp. 7–8.
37. Andrew S. Erickson, “Ballistic Trajectory: China Appears to Be Approaching Operational Ca-
pability with Its Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (February 2010), p. 3.
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crippling a carrier or demonstrating that it can, will deter the U.S. armed 
forces from fulfilling orders to go to Taiwan’s defense is based on a misreading 
of the ethos of the U.S. military establishment. 
On the contrary, if a U.S. carrier should become a “mission kill” or be 
rendered operationally ineffective (even if not sunk), this would have a huge 
psychological, perhaps galvanizing, impact on the Americans. The U.S. Navy 
has not suffered such a loss since the end of World War Two. Such a blow, 
particularly if it resulted from a stealthy, preemptive strike, is likely to have 
a “Pearl Harbor” or “September 11” effect on U.S. forces, spurring them to 
fight back. The assumption that they would withdraw, as after the 1993 “Black 
Hawk Down”38 incident in Somalia, defies U.S. military tradition. Whether 
the general public, and in particular the political establishment, in the U.S. 
will react in line with the military establishment in a crisis over Taiwan will 
depend on the political reality at the time and cannot be predicted. But in 
a real crisis, “rally round the flag,” persevere, and expect to win in the end 
have long been part of the American ethos and national experience; these are 
likely to be the default reaction.
The building up of China’s capacity to deter the U.S. from sending forces 
to help Taiwan defend itself is also based on China’s development of high 
technology capacity for a war of the future. This includes the testing of anti-
satellite missiles, ballistic missile defense capability, and cyber attacks. Since 
1997, the Chinese military has adopted the principle laid down by then top 
leader Jiang Zemin that “informationized” warfare (xinxizhan) should be-
come the core of China’s new strategic thinking.39 This has now become part 
of the PLA’s doctrine, known as “fighting local wars under informationized 
conditions,” which “seeks to develop a fully networked architecture capable 
of coordinating military operations on land, in air, at sea, in space, and across 
the electromagnetic spectrum.”40 This involves giving the PLA the capacity to 
38. See Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1999). In 1993 the Clinton administration, propelled by the killing of 18 American soldiers in 
the battle of Mogadishu, pulled U.S. forces out of Somalia, citing the futility of a “poorly organized 
United Nations nation building operation.” See Richard W. Stewart, “The United States Army in 
Somalia, 1992–1994,” <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm>, p. 26, ac-
cessed February 25, 2010. 
39. Zhang Mingrui, Zhonggong Guofang Zhanlue Fazhan [Developments in the national defense 
strategy of the Chinese communists] (Taipei: Hongye wenhua, 1998), pp. 484–86.
40. Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and 
Computer Network Exploitation (McLean, Va.: Northrop Grumman for the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 2009), p. 10.
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use information network technology to connect its previously separate war-
fighting services and technologically advanced support units, including cyber 
warfare units, into an integrated force for operational purposes. Since then, 
finding “ways to catch up and leapfrog [the U.S.] has become a central tenet 
in this search for a new development model.”41 Indeed, “PLA strategists firmly 
subscribe to the arguments . . . that latecomers have important advantages 
over pioneers and that a highly selective approach is required to target only 
the most technologically advanced areas for development.”42 
It was in line with this new strategic thinking that China tested its anti-
satellite capability in January 2007. Because even a “small scale antisatellite 
attack in a crisis against 50 U.S. satellites . . . could have a catastrophic ef-
fect not only on U.S. military forces, but on the U.S. civilian economy,” 
this was meant to be a significant addition to the PLA’s capacity to deter 
the U.S. military from interfering over Taiwan.43 The demonstration of this 
new capability was further augmented. In January 2010, the Chinese tested 
“ground-based midcourse missile interception technology” by shooting down 
a ballistic missile in mid-flight. This was described by Professor Tan Kaijia of 
the Chinese National Defense University as a shield to defend China’s own 
vital installations and thus an instrument to close an important window of 
vulnerability.44 Combined with the anti-satellite capability, this was meant 
to be, at least in part, a “demonstration of Chinese capability to disrupt and 
degrade U.S. space capabilities in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict.”45 
Such deterrence is reinforced by the prospect that the U.S. may not enjoy 
as much advantage in cyber warfare against China as it does in conventional 
warfare. Indeed, the congressionally directed Independent Assessment Panel 
known as the Allard Commission takes the view that “without significant 
improvements in the leadership and management of national security space 
programs, U.S. space preeminence will erode ‘to the extent that space ceases 
41. Tai-ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 243.
42. Ibid.
43. Michael P. Pillsbury, An Assessment of China’s Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programmes, 
Policies, and Doctrines (paper submitted to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com-
mission, January 19, 2007), pp. 3, 17.
44. Peter J. Brown, “China Vents Anger with Missile Test,” Asia Times Online, January 20, 2010, 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LA20Ad01.html>, accessed March 1, 2010.
45. Ibid.
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to provide a competitive national security advantage’.”46 Notwithstanding 
doubts over whether the U.S. can sustain its current apparently declining 
advantages, no full-scale cyber war between major powers has ever been 
waged.47 Whether the technological edge the U.S. may now enjoy could be 
neutralized by the sheer volume and variety of cyber attacks from China in 
a crisis cannot be predicted. 
As one analysis puts it, in the event of a “conflict with the U.S., China 
will likely use its C[omputer] N[etwork] O[perations] capabilities to attack 
select nodes on the [U.S.] military’s Non-classified Internet Protocol Router 
Network (NIPRNET) and unclassified DOD and civilian contractor logistics 
networks in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and allied countries in the Asia-
Pacific region.” The goal would be to “delay U.S. deployments and impact 
[the] combat effectiveness of troops already in theater.”48 How effective such 
attacks would be cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty. One 
needs to bear in mind that cyber threats “evolve (both on their own and as 
defenses against them are discovered), and new vulnerabilities often emerge 
as innovation changes underlying system architectures, implementation, or 
basic assumptions.”49 The prospect of a cyber war with China is certainly 
unappealing to the U.S. government and military. The actual outcome of 
such a conflict is a matter of conjecture. But the point remains that the inher-
ent uncertainty cannot deter the U.S. military from fulfilling its obligations 
under the TRA, an American law. 
widEr CoNSidErATioNS
One also needs to bear in mind that the actual capacity of U.S. forces to respond 
to a crisis across the Taiwan Strait a decade or two down the line will depend not 
only on the nature and scale of the Chinese threat at that time. It will also be af-
fected by U.S. forces’ current preoccupation with their missions in Afghanistan. 
All branches of the U.S. armed forces have come under great stress as a result 
46. United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Stra-
tegic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain), May 20, 
2009 (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2009), p. 1. 
47. Russia did resort to cyber warfare against Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008, but it was 
not a contest between peers.
48. Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare, p. 8.
49. National Research Council of the National Academies, Toward a Safer and More Secure 
Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008), p. 35.
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of the extended deployment there—and in Iraq previously. This applies even to 
the Navy, which had 12,000 sailors “on the ground in U.S. Central Command’s 
area of responsibility and 9,000 sailors at sea supporting combat operations” in 
early 2010.50 The high tempo of operations has also unquestionably led to much 
higher wear and tear on equipment and maintenance needs. The costs of deploy-
ment have also eroded budgeted funds that would otherwise have been spent on 
modernizing and upgrading existing capabilities. The imperative to ensure that 
U.S. forces are well supported for the current primarily counterinsurgency opera-
tions has meant that force development is being reoriented away from preparing 
for traditional conflict between states, to counterinsurgency and state-building 
purposes. The first signs of such a development can be seen, for example, in the 
capping of the number of F-22 Raptor air superiority fighters produced and 
deployed. This trend is also visible in the debates over whether the navy should 
focus on its littoral rather than blue water capabilities. 
That said, current “high end” combat equipment and capital ships, and 
future “hybrid” war capabilities will synergistically provide the flexibility and 
scalability to meet major requirements of warfare across the spectrum. Like-
wise, while the risk of preparing for the last war cannot be avoided entirely, 
the current over-stretch of its forces does have a silver lining for the U.S. 
Senior officers in the next two decades will all have vast and real combat 
command experience, which is an intrinsic advantage that cannot be replaced 
by any amount of peacetime training. 
The capacity of U.S. forces to deploy effectively in support of Taiwan’s 
self-defense will also depend on the cooperation of some key U.S. allies. The 
greatest value of allied support is to confer legitimacy on any U.S. interven-
tion. In military terms, the U.S. will not expect allies like the U.K., Australia, 
or NATO members to do more than provide warships to relieve the U.S. 
Navy from existing commitments so that it can deploy more of its own to 
the Taiwan area. But the navy will need Japan to make base facilities available 
and protect them.51 If U.S. forces must give actual support to Taiwan, the 
50. Lisa Daniel, “Tempo Takes Toll on Navy, Marine Equipment,” America’s Navy, February 26, 
2010, <http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=51559>, accessed March 1, 2010.
51. Although Japan has a significant missile defense capacity, the U.S. is unlikely to ask Japan to 
deploy its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s capacity because of concerns 
over Japan’s constitutional constraints and the prospect that this would provoke the Chinese. For 
the security dilemma involved, see Thomas J. Christiansen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and 
the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23:4 (1999), pp. 65–67.
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availability of the American air force base in Kadena and the Marine Corps 
base at Iwakuni (both in Okinawa) is of critical importance. If they can 
leave the security of such bases to their Japanese ally, this will significantly 
strengthen their capacity to deploy combat assets to the front. Whether any 
U.S. base on mainland Japan would be available would obviously be a matter 
of politics and diplomacy, and largely out of the hands of the U.S. military. 
PoliCy iMPliCATioNS
The most obvious conclusion is that however impressive the Chinese military 
modernization program may be in the next decade or two, the PLA can only 
substantially narrow the gap, not surpass the U.S., in military capabilities. 
On its current trajectory, China simply cannot build up sufficient advantage 
within such a time frame to deter the U.S. military from fulfilling its duty 
under the TRA. This will not change even if the PLA’s progress were to exceed 
all expectations and U.S. force capabilities declined as a result of current de-
ployments. The key issues here are attitude, assessment, and ethos, and the 
U.S. military would still feel duty bound to uphold an American law even at 
the cost of considerable losses. 
The above does not imply, of course, that the U.S. government of the day 
will inevitably decide to help Taiwan defend itself. The specific conditions 
that give rise to such a contingency will have a massive effect on what policy 
makers in Washington do. The impact of the U.S. involvements in Afghani-
stan and Iraq may turn out to be greater on the political will of the nation 
than on the military’s determination and capacity to take on such a challenge. 
A “post-Afghanistan syndrome” may emerge, similar to that which propelled 
American aversion to overseas military interventions after the Vietnam War. 
Or it may not. How the U.S. commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq will 
impact policy making cannot be known in advance. At the moment, the 
outcomes of these involvements are themselves undecided, and the timing 
of a crisis over Taiwan, should it come, cannot be predicted. 
What this study shows is that Chinese military intimidation of Taiwan can-
not deliver Beijing’s preferred scenario as long as China cannot deter the U.S. 
from implementing the terms of the TRA. In a country built on the basis of 
the rule of law, a domestic legal commitment cannot be easily dismissed by 
any administration. The narrowing of the gap in military terms will no doubt 
make the U.S. military more cautious, but the ultimate decision to interfere 
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or not is up to the political establishment of the day. The U.S. military will 
implement the order from the president following due process. 
The democratic nature of politics in Taiwan also makes it practically po-
litically impossible for any elected president of Taiwan to accept unification 
while Chinese deterrence against U.S. intervention remains ineffective. What 
China’s threat to use force can achieve is to deter Taiwan from formally assert-
ing de jure independence and changing its official name from the Republic 
of China to something like a Republic of Taiwan. Taiwan already acts on 
this deterrence. 
Until the PLA can effectively deter the U.S. from helping Taiwan to defend 
itself, there is much to be said for allowing Taiwan to maintain a credible 
defense. As long as the U.S. requires none of its forces to become actively 
involved, it will continue to keep its military forwardly deployed and pos-
tured to respond. But U.S. forces are likely to be more forwardly deployed 
if the situation in the Taiwan region requires, which increases the risk of 
unintended escalation. Reducing such a risk matters if China’s objective is 
limited to taking control of Taiwan by political and diplomatic means, and 
it has no wish to find itself unwittingly fighting a war with the U.S. whose 
outcome is unlikely to favor China in the foreseeable future. In other words, 
until Beijing can effectively deter the U.S. and thus coerce Taiwan to ne-
gotiate for unification, its best interest is served by reducing the risk for an 
unintended escalation. 
For Taiwan itself, the most important implication is that it must maintain 
sufficient capabilities in case of an attack to hold out long enough for the 
American political process to run its course and for U.S. forces to be de-
ployed to help. With the threat rising from China’s expanding stock of short 
range ballistic missiles, Taiwan cannot hope to deploy sufficient anti-missile 
capabilities, which are disproportionately expensive. But it can prepare to 
strengthen its capacity to ensure that its command and control system and its 
major weapon systems survive the initial waves of missile attacks. Although 
Taiwan will need to modernize its defense systems, this should not be seen 
primarily in terms of major arms purchases. 
The truly critical factors for Taiwan are securing the right kind of arms, 
building up the capacity to resist for several weeks with minimum American 
support, and upgrading its command, control, and communications sys-
tems so its military can communicate effectively with U.S. forces if the need 
arises. The reality is that a country of Taiwan’s size cannot maintain a defense 
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force large and well stocked enough to withstand the PLA on a sustained 
basis. Thus, for arms purchases a critical consideration is whether they can 
be quickly replenished by the U.S. from existing stocks. In this context, the 
F-16 remains highly appropriate for the coming decade as long as Taiwan’s 
air force pilots receive sufficient training. But this advantage will disappear 
as the bulk of F-16s is retired from active U.S. service. Likewise, Taiwan can 
strengthen its capacity to hold out by investing heavily in non-lethal capacity 
(such as the resources to make temporary repairs to airfields) and in upgrad-
ing its communications equipment. 
Given the stakes involved and the risk of escalation should the world’s 
two leading nuclear powers find themselves in a military confrontation, 
the imperative must be for all parties concerned to find a way to deal with 
China’s ambition without the use of force. Accommodation is necessary: the 
 government in Taiwan cannot assert de jure independence, a clear red line for 
Beijing.52 But the key to a peaceful solution lies ultimately in the hands of the 
Chinese government. If it really wants unification with democratic Taiwan, 
it must make the prospect sufficiently attractive for Taiwanese  voters. Until 
then, efforts should be made to deter Beijing from choosing the military 
 option; this remains the best-case scenario in the foreseeable future.
52. The intricacies for the U.S. to deter both China and Taiwan from actions that could lead to 
a confrontation are laid out in Richard Bush, “The U.S. Policy of Dual Deterrence,” in Tsang, ed., 
If China Attacks Taiwan, pp. 35–53. See also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Stra-
tegic Clarity?” in idem, ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), pp. 186–211.
